A person identifying themself as Alexander S. Peak sent me the following critique of my post and requested that I publish it. This same person, unfortunately, failed to respond to my request that he publish it on its own somewhere. I made that request because it’s a substantive post in its own right, deserving publication on its own. Lacking a response, I’m going to publish it here and make my response to it part three of this Burma and Chevron followup series.
Chevron in Burma: Ally of the State?
October 27th, 2007 by Alexander S. Peak
Businesses are not inherently just simply by the fact that they provide services. Any serious libertarian knows this, and knows that for a business to be just, it needs to abide by the non-aggression axiom as must any other person or group. And just as any person who aggresses against another or others is a natural criminal, so too is any firm that does the same.
Earlier this month, based on the above logical premise, Mr. Brad Spangler argued that Chevron and Total, two oil companies, have forfeited any right they may have to their property. However, I have little choice but to tentatively disagree with Mr. Spangler. It may yet be proven to me that Mr. Spangler is correct, that these companies have indeed acted in a manner “sufficient to nullify corporate property claims,†even if said nullification is limited just “until such time as Chevron and Total sever all ties with the Burmese government.â€
What have Chevron and Total done? They have taken actions which have invariably helped a brutal military dictatorship to stay afloat, specifically the Burmese state which has recently been engaged in the massacring of pacifist monks. This much is undeniable.
But it seems to me that their actions have not been sufficient to nullify their claims to property, in part or in whole. For such a nullification to be valid, the business must have done one of two things.
1.They must have engaged purposely in initiation of force (e.g. murder).
2.They must have requested or purchased on the red market the use of aggression by another person or group (e.g. the hiring of a hit-man).
3.They must have benefited from the use of aggression by another person or group, the benefit being something they could have turned down (e.g. subsidies).
As far as I can determine, neither Chevron nor Total have done this in their relationship with the brutal Burmese dictatorship. It may be that either business, or both, has done this and, therefore, truly has scarified its property claims—but, the article Mr. Spangler provides does not give enough information to definitely declare such; hence, my motivation to tentatively disagree.
To understand the nature of this relationship, let us compare it to individuals. If Jones gives Smith a couple hundred dollars, and Smith uses the money to buy a gun with which he kills Robinson, Smith bears total responsibility for the crime he himself has committed. Unless Jones requested Smith to kill Robinson, Jones bears no responsibility.
Let us say that a year later, Jackson gives Smith a gun, knowing Smith’s criminal background. Smith, eventually, goes to shoot Jones over some trivial difference. Does Jackson bear any responsibility for the death of Jones? Again, no, because Jackson never did anything to indicate that he condoned murder, and in no way personally violated Jones’s rights. The responsibility, therefore, rests again solely on Smith.
According to the article, “Offshore natural-gas facilities deliver their extracted gas to Thailand through Burma’s Yadana pipeline. The pipeline was built with slave labor, forced into servitude by the Burmese military.
“The original pipeline partner, Unocal, was sued by EarthRights International for the use of slave labor. As soon as the suit was settled out of court, Chevron bought Unocal.â€
Slave labour, very obviously, is unjust. Unocal benefited directly from the use of aggression by the Burmese government, an aggression employed for the purpose (but not necessarily the sole purpose) of benefiting Unocal. If Unocal were still in existence today, it would surely have surrendered its claim to corporate property—however, the article implies that Unocal no longer exists, having been bought out by Chevron.
Let us say that, after committing the murder of Jones, Smith transfers the title of all of his property to Jackson. Following this transfer, the family of Jones sues Smith for the murder of Jones, and the private arbiter determines that Smith owes the Jones estate half a million dollars.1 Does this mean that Jackson must hand over his newly gained property to the Jones family? No; rather, it means that Smith is now in debt to the Jones family. This is a debt he will have to work off, a may indeed take Smith the rest of his life.2 However, what should happen if Smith dies, i.e. ceases to exist, prior to the debt being paid off? Assuming Smith has no insurance plan, the debt can never be paid off. To force anyone else—the children of Smith, for example—to pay off the debt would entail slavery, the use of aggression, which cannot be permitted under our framework of justice. Likewise, if Smith commits suicide, the debt can never be paid off.3
The case with Unocal may be slightly different. Unocal has certainly ceased to exist (assuming that is what is meant to be implied when the article says that it has been bought by Chevron), and therefore cannot pay off the debts it clearly owes to those victims of slavery still living by whose labour they benefited. However, those who were in previous control of Unocal (presumably) do still exist, and therefore can and ought to pay off their debts to those who were exploited for their benefit.
Does Chevron have any debt to those victims of slave labour previously mentioned? Assuming this article has not left something out, then it would appear they do not, just as Jackson owes nothing to the Jones family in our analogy.
The article goes on to say, “Chevron’s role in propping up the brutal regime in Burma is clear. According to Marco Simons, U.S. legal director at EarthRights International: ‘Sanctions haven’t worked because gas is the lifeline of the regime. Before Yadana went online, Burma’s regime was facing severe shortages of currency. It’s really Yadana and gas projects that kept the military regime afloat to buy arms and ammunition and pay its soldiers.’â€
In short, through Chevron’s actions, an evil regime has benefited. For this reason, it would certainly be reasonable to boycott Chevron. But, at most, Chevron’s actions (based on the information provided) can be deemed as immoral. They cannot be deemed as unethical, and thus no use of force against Chevron can be deemed just (again, based on the information provided—if Chevron has done anything in its relation to the Burmese dictatorship worthy of having force employed against it, this information has not been presented in the article).4
I find it unfortunate that the article does not explain in what way Chevron’s actions have benefited the military regime. It could be that the Burmese military is charging Chevron taxes for use of its pipeline. A tax-payer is never a villain simply for being a tax-payer; he/she is always a victim. But let us say, for sake of argument, that Chevron has voluntarily offered to give money to the Burmese military regime. What then?
Let us say a gang of hoodlums kill a man, and then retreat to a fortified compound, which they have stocked full of arms. The family of the slain man has hired a protection agency to bring these villains to justice. The protection agency knows it would be dangerous to storm the compound, and because they know there are innocent children in the compound, opt to not turn this into another Waco.5 So, they decide to wait. They know the hoodlums have little in the way of food, and will therefore have to surrender eventually.
Jackson knows of this and, feeling morally opposed to seeing anyone (even murderers) starve, chooses to bring food to the compound every day. Has Jackson acted unethically? No. In a free society, it would be a valid approach for people to boycott dealing with Jackson, but it would not be valid for anyone to aggress against him. The same would apply if Jackson was continually donating to a military dictatorship elsewhere in the world.
The article does give us one tidbit of information which may make it valid to employ force against Chevron. The article tells us that “While [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] served on the [Chevron board of directors], Chevron was sued for involvement in the killing of non-violent protesters in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.â€
The nature of the involvement is left ambiguous by the article; but let us assume, for sake of argument, the worst: Chevron knowingly murdered said non-violent protestors. If this is the case, then without a doubt Chevron has violated the non-aggression axiom, and all of those involved in the decision to, planning of, and carrying out of the murder must make reparations in some way. Even if the killing was the result of negligence on the part of Chevron or its employees, then Chevron or its employees would still bear some responsibility in the matter, and would have to make reparations of some sort.
But let us say that they knew someone else—Smith, for example, or the Nigerian government—was going to commit the murder and did nothing to prevent it. This could easily be what the article implies when it claims Chevron had “involvement,†but this would not justify the use of force against Chevron. No person, or group of persons, can be ethically required to take an action, except in the paying off of a debt.6 Libertarian ethics limits itself solely to what actions persons may not take, such as the commission of murder, rape, theft, or battery, or the hiring of another or others to commit such acts. Although ethically permitted to take action physically preventing others from doing these things, Robinson is never obligated to take action physically preventing others from doing these things. While it’s not unethical to boycott dealing with Robinson for opting to not take the time or energy necessary to help save someone’s life—say a drowning victim—it is unethical to initiate force against Robinson simply because you or I deem his inactivity immoral.
The article gives us another tidbit that ought to raise some flags, but again fails to give enough information to condemn Chevron. Says the article, “The protests in Burma were actually triggered by a government-imposed increase in fuel prices.â€
This could mean one of two things. On the one hand, Burma might have imposed a fuel tax which had the result of increasing fuel prices but which had no positive benefit for Chevron. (If anything, such an economic burden would hurt Chevron more than it helps.) Clearly, the aggressor here would be the Burmese regime. On the other hand, Burma may have imposed a price floor on gasoline. If they did this, and at the behest of Chevron, then one could make some claim that Chevron has, in part, nullified its claim to property. However, if this were imposed without the consent of Chevron, then Chevron can hardly be to blame, especially since it would be unable to turn down the price floor in the same way it could turn down a subsidy.
The article presents quite enough to convince me that a boycott of Chevron and Total is in order. These businesses are, whether purposely or inadvertently, helping to prop up a disgusting regime known for its human rights violations. But because the article does not demonstrate positively that these businesses have violated the non-aggression axiom, I must—at least for now—remain in disagreement with Mr. Spangler as to whether Chevron or Total have, in part or in whole, nullified their claim to corporate property.
I admit, however, that I know virtually nothing about the history of Burma. Nor do I know anything about the histories of Chevron or Total. The extent of my knowledge regarding these two companies is limited solely to what I’ve read in a single article. It is very possible that, with a better understanding of the events surrounding these businesses and the Burmese regime, I may very well be compelled by reason to change my opinion.
1 I do not wish to imply here that one can put a price on a life. Rather, the Jones family decided it was in their better interest to sue Smith for a certain amount of money rather than to have Jones executed for his crime.
2 See The Market for Liberty (1970) by Linda & Morris Tannehill for a brilliant explanation of how debts may be worked off, and the incentives inherent in a laissez-faire society for fulfilling such obligations. (The Tannehills’ work is, in my opinion, not without flaw, but was nonetheless a monumental achievement.)
3 In theory, a charity could appear in a laissez-faire society with the purpose of granting money to families of murder victims in the event that the murderer commits suicide prior to paying off his/her debts, in which case the debt could be paid off. But this is not necessarily going to develop, and therefore it cannot be said that there can be a guarantee that such debts get paid off.
4 An unethical act can be met with retaliatory force, whereas immoral acts, because of the subjectivity of morality, cannot. Murray N. Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty (1982) gives some examples of acts which, although they may be immoral, are not unethical. (Dr. Rothbard’s work is, like the Tannehills’, not without flaw. Nevertheless it’s a great work and was pivotal in my philosophical development.)
5 In a free society, harming an innocent person, even in pursuit of a guilty person or persons, would be considered unjust. A police agent who harmed someone who was innocent would face punishment, as he/she would not be considered in any way above the law.
6 See page 71 of The Market for Liberty for a greater understanding of the nature of debts. The obligation to pay a debt is an obligation one takes upon him-/herself through his/her aggressive or negligent action. Although nobody has an innate obligation to act, one may have an acquired obligation to act through commission of unjust acts.
